Abstract
The 2014 referendum on Scottish independence disclosed contrasting perspectives on the nature of a prospective intelligence relationship between an independent Scotland and other nations, particularly the remainder of the United Kingdom (UK). The Scottish Government maintained that intelligence sharing would be in the best interests of both Scotland and the UK. The UK Government, however, raised concerns about the nature and extent of an independent Scotland’s intelligence relationships with both the UK and other international partners. Based on documentary analysis and first-hand qualitative fieldwork undertaken in 2014 this article argues that to fully understand the implications of Scottish independence upon prospective intelligence liaison it is necessary to differentiate between intelligence sharing and intelligence cooperation. Although limited by the ‘control principle’ and national interests an independent Scotland would almost certainly receive intelligence from the UK on an ad hoc basis; particularly if there was an imminent threat. Establishing routine intelligence sharing, and deeper forms of cooperation, would depend upon the specialist contribution or capability Scotland could make to its prospective partners. Whilst some such scope exists in relation to the UK, an independent Scotland would most likely encounter greater challenges in establishing cooperation with, or membership of, the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 3-24 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | The Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 1 |
Publication status | Published - 14 Oct 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |