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The ‘pay-or-consent’ model and competition policy: a case comment on the European Commission’s decision against Meta under the Digital Markets Act

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Abstract

This case comment analyses the European Commission’s first non-compliance decision under the Digital Markets Act (DMA), focusing on Meta’s “pay-orconsent” model and its incompatibility with Article 5(2). The Commission held that Meta failed to provide users with a genuinely equivalent, privacy-protective alternative to behavioural advertising, thereby undermining the voluntariness of consent and commodifying user data in violation of DMA standards. The comment situates the ruling within broader EU regulatory trends, highlighting parallels with Apple’s infringement of Article 5(4) DMA and the Commission’s emerging outcomes-oriented enforcement approach. It argues that these decisions jointly clarify gatekeeper obligations, expand the meaning of “free of charge,” and signal the Commission’s commitment to substantive, rather than merely formal, compliance. The analysis concludes that the Meta decision sets a significant legal and market precedent, reinforcing the DMA’s goals of contestability, user autonomy, and structural safeguards against entrenched digital dominance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)195-215
Number of pages21
JournalYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
Volume18
Issue number32
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23 Dec 2025
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • gatekeepers
  • DMA
  • privacy
  • user content
  • data protection

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