This chapter explores the politics of intelligence accountability in the context of the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and the 2015 General Election in the UK. Drawing upon Peter Gill’s model for assessing the effectiveness of security intelligence accountability, it argues that the Scottish Government’s proposals for intelligence accountability in an independent Scotland indicated a vague and conservative intention to maintain similar mechanisms to the existing UK political settlement. By exploring the accountability mechanisms for security intelligence in other jurisdictions, this chapter suggests that shortcomings in the Scottish Government’s proposals could have been addressed by learning lessons and adopting practices and processes from beyond the UK. The aftermath of the referendum — particularly the landslide victory in Scotland for the pro-independence SNP in the 2015 UK General Election — may herald consequences for both intelligence accountability in the UK and any future plan for accountability mechanisms in an independent Scotland. The previously unconsidered prospect of direct SNP representation on the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) — now a reality in the UK — raises the scenario that pro-independence politicians will develop the expertise, capital, and political legitimacy necessary for effective intelligence accountability that were lacking in the pre-referendum political landscape.
|Title of host publication||Security in a Small Nation|
|Subtitle of host publication||Scotland, Democracy, Politics|
|Publisher||Open Book Publishers|
|ISBN (Electronic)||978-1-78374-270-7, 978-1-78374-271-4, 978-1-78374-272-1|
|ISBN (Print)||978-1-78374-268-4, 978-1-78374-269-1|
|Publication status||Published - 28 Mar 2017|
Atkinson, C. (2017). Scotland and the Politics of Intelligence Accountability. In A. Neale (Ed.), Security in a Small Nation: Scotland, Democracy, Politics (2017 ed., pp. 125-147). Open Book Publishers. https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0078.05