Political advisers and policy making in ministerial cabinet systems: the case of Belgium, Greece & the European Commission

While in many Western-European countries the ascend of political advisers or special advisers is a relatively recent phenomenon, in others there is a long tradition of engaging ministerial cabinets, as the structural interfaces between politics and administration. Relatively large, ministerial cabinets consist of political advisers who as “an extension of their minister” in a superior position in relation to senior civil service, constantly put pressure on the civil servants in order to ensure political responsiveness. These ministerial advisers are endowed with crucial policy-making roles and colonise all stages of the policy process. The present contribution makes use of the latest material on the policy analytical roles of ministerial advisers in Belgium, Greece and the European Commission, collected through surveys and elite interviews, in order to analyse ministerial cabinet advisers’ policy making activity. Beyond the idiosyncrasies of every ministerial cabinet system we observe that ministerial cabinet advisers form mini shadow administrations whose personnel performs multiple roles, with an emphasis on policy management and co-ordination within and across the executive, combining expertise with political feasibility, and exercising political control over the administration.