On the Effectiveness of Full-ASLR on 64-bit Linux

Hector Marco Gisbert, Ismael Ripoli

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review


Address-Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a technique used to thwart attacks which relies on knowing the location of the target code or data. The effectiveness of ASLR hinges on the entirety of the address space layout
remaining unknown to the attacker. Only executables compiled as Position Independent Executable (PIE) can obtain the maximum protection from the ASLR technique since all the sections are loaded at random locations.

We have identified a security weakness on the implementation of the ASLR in Linux when the executable is PIE compiled, named offset2lib. A PoC attack is described to illustrate how the offset2lib can be exploited. Our attack
bypasses the three most widely adopted and effective protection techniques: No-eXecutable bit (NX), address space layout randomization (ASLR) and stack smashing protector (SSP). A remote shell is got in less than one second.

Finally, how the RenewSSP technique can be used as a workaround is discussed and how to remove the offset2lib weakness from the current ASLR implementation is also presented.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages9
Publication statusPublished - 20 Nov 2014
Externally publishedYes
EventIn-depth Security Conference 2014 (DeepSec) - Vienna, Austria
Duration: 18 Nov 201421 Nov 2014


ConferenceIn-depth Security Conference 2014 (DeepSec)
Internet address


Dive into the research topics of 'On the Effectiveness of Full-ASLR on 64-bit Linux'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this