Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?

Biwesh Neupane, Chandra Thapa*, Andrew Marshall, Suman Neupane, Chaman Shrestha

*Corresponding author for this work

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Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.
Original languageEnglish
Article number101962
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
Early online date9 Feb 2024
Publication statusPublished - 31 Mar 2024


  • board monitoring
  • foreign institutional investors
  • financial crisis
  • firm value
  • innovation


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