Decision Theoretic Assessment Model for Online Business Games

Several approaches to reputation and trustworthiness assessment based on probabilistic assessment have considered studying its usefulness in online business environments. It is seen that probabilistic models of reputation and
trustworthiness assessment aids in resolving uncertainty by assessing the trustworthiness level of players. In this paper we intend to further enhance the assessment by combining probabilistic assessment with expected utility
for each player, thus resulting in a decision theoretic assessment. In this form of assessment, a player makes a decision on the basis of what she believes (given by the probabilistic assessment) and what she wants (given by the utility value of the choice). This method ensures that the players possess a continuous measure of statequality. The assessment of trustworthiness in this model is guided by the principle of maximum expected utility,
where a rational player chooses an action only if that action meets her expected utility. Our results show that the decision theoretic models of assessment positively contribute to the evolution of cooperation in a player society.
Experiments have been carried out in a business game environment where transactions are modelled using the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.