Candidate selection, intraparty competition and incumbency turnover: analysis of the Belgian lower house elections

This paper examines the effects of candidate selection on intra-party incumbency turnover. In the intra-party context, we expect to see competition among candidates for selectors’ support. However, competition levels may vary over different types of candidate selection processes. Based on the US case, some authors argue that highly inclusive selectorates produce less competition and are more advantageous to incumbents (Ansolabehere et al. 2007; Herrnson, 1997). Recent research on list PR systems contradicts this claim (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). This article contributes to this research with a detailed account of this relation in flexible-list systems. We distinguish between four types of candidate selection outcomes for incumbents: realistic, marginal, or unrealistic list positions, and de-selection. The analysis is based on the case of the Belgian Lower House (1987-2010). The results show that incumbents rarely get de-selected in selection methods with member influence, which is in line with findings in majoritarian systems.